Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1989

A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order Cases in the Appellate
Courts
Terry A. Bethel
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, bethel@indiana.edu

C. A, Melfi

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bethel, Terry A. and Melfi, C. A,, "A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order Cases in the Appellate Courts"
(1989). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2463.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2463

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

A Probit Model of NLRB Bargaining Order
Cases in the Appellate Courts
C.A. M E L F I and T.A. B E T H E L *
Indiana University, Bloomington, I N 47405
This study examines N L R B bargaining orders that have gone to appeals courts
and ascertains what factors influence whether or not the order is enforced and to
what degree these factors influence the likelihood of enforcement. Substantial information has been collectedfrom each reported appellate decision that reviewed
N L R B bargaining orders issued over a four-year period. A probit regression
model is employed to examine whether factors related to an employer's unfair
labor practice campaign are involved in the circuit court's enforcement decisions
or if more weight is given to unrelated factors, such as the circuit in which the appeal is heard or the amount of judicial delay involved in the appeals process.
I.

Introduction

The basic policy of the National Labor Relations Act is one of majority rule:
Unions typically acquire representational rights by convincing a majority of
employees that such representation is in their best interests. Unions then may seek
voluntary recognition from the employer or petition for an election conducted by
the National Labor Relations Board. Employers frequently resist the organizational efforts of unions, and during the campaign period preceding the election
the employer and the union compete for employees' support through speeches,
letters, and other forms of propaganda. If an employer's campaign practices
threaten employees or otherwise interfere with their ability to exercise free choice,
the NLRB usually conducts a re-run election and orders the employer to stop the
unlawful campaign practices. Sometimes, however, the NLRB determines that,
despite its order to cease and desist, the employer has created such a coercive
atmosphere that a subsequent election will be affected. In those instances, the
NLRB may remedy an employer's unlawful conduct by ordering it to bargain
with the union; this is commonly called a Gissel bargaining order. ~The order is
issued even though the union may have lost the election and, until recently, even
though there was no indication that the union had support from a majority of

*Funding for this research was supported by NSF Grant SES-86-18517.
'The name comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in N L R B v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969), in which the Court upheld the Board's authority to impose remedial bargaining orders.
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employees.2 The N L R B ' s assumption is that such orders protect the rights of employees by denying to employers the fruits of their illegal conduct and by establishing the very relationship that the conduct sought to destroy.
The courts of appeals review a large number o f bargaining order cases. This
finding by itself is not surprising. N L R B remedial orders are not self-executing. I f
an employer fails or refuses to comply with an order, the Board's only recourse is
to petition for enforcement in the appellate courts. 3 Moreover, the employer in
bargaining order cases has engaged in unusually serious unfair labor practices,
and the Board might believe that judicial enforcement is appropriate to encourage compliance.
Similarly, " a n y person aggrieved" by the issuance of the Board's remedial
order, such as the employer against whom the order operates, can petition the
court for review.' Given the controversial nature o f the bargaining order remedy
and given that such orders typically issue only against employers who have fought
vigorously against a union, it might be expected that these employers will use the
review process as an additional avenue o f avoiding, or at least of delaying, the
bargaining obligation.
This study examines bargaining orders that have gone to the appeals courts
and will ascertain which factors influence whether or not a bargaining order is enforced and to what degree these factors influence the likelihood of enforcement.
We have collected substantial information from each reported appellate decision
that reviewed N L R B bargaining orders issued over a four-year period. In what
follows, we examine whether factors related to the employer's unfair labor practice campaign are involved in the circuit court's enforcement decision or whether
more weight is given to unrelated factors, such as the circuit in which the appeal is
heard or the a m o u n t of judicial delay involved in the appeals process. We also
examine whether or not factors specifically mentioned by the appeals courts in
reaching their decisions agree with our empirical findings.
II.

B a r g a i n i n g O r d e r s in the A p p e l l a t e C o u r t s

Under the National L a b o r Relations Act, both the existence of and the remedies
for unfair labor practices are matters entrusted primarily to the discretion of the
NLRB. As the Supreme Court has said, "Congress could not catalogue all the
2At issue in Gisselwas the NLRB's authority to impose a bargaining order as a remedy for an employer's serious unfair labor practices when the union had once demonstrated majority support through
signed authorization cards. In Conair Corp., 261 NLRB 1189(1982), enforcement denied, 721 F. 2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),the Board claimedauthority to issue a bargaining order as a remedyfor particularly egregiousemployer conduct, even in the absence of a showing of union majority status. Conair
was overruled by the Board in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270 NLRB 578 (1984). For a fuller discussion of
the issues raised by these cases, see Bethel (1984).
3See Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160(e).
'See Section 10(f) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §160(f).
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devices and strategies for circumventing the policies o f the Act. Nor could it
define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate the policies in an infinite variety
of specific situations."5 The responsibility to both identify and redress unfair
labor practices, therefore, was assigned to the Board "as one of those agencies
presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field o f
knowledge, ''~ with its decisions being subject to only limited judicial review.
Moreover, Supreme Court decisions make it clear that the Board's expertise is entitled to considerable deference by the c o u r t s , particularly with respect to the
formulation of remedies.
By statute, the courts of appeals have the power to enforce the Board's
orders, to modify them, or to set them aside. Board findings of fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, are conclusive. 7 Still, there have been numerous requests
by the appellate courts that the Board devise a set of standards or guidelines controlling the issuance o f bargaining orders. A review of the courts' opinions, however, indicates that they, too, are guilty of inconsistency in their enforcement of
the Board's orders. 8
Both the circuit courts and the Board are reluctant to frustrate employees'
free choice by forcing an unwanted union on them. Therefore, especially if the
union has lost a representation election, there must be sufficient evidence to indicate that the outcome of the election was a response to the employer's anti-union
actions rather than a reflection of actual employee sentiment.
It is difficult to categorize the type of employer misconduct that results in a
bargaining order. Among the unfair labor practices committed by an employer
during a union organizing campaign are " h a l l m a r k " violations. These unfair
labor practices are said t o ' 'go to the heart of the [National Labor Relations] A c t "
by reinforcing employees' awareness of their employer's control over the workers' economic destiny, thereby enabling the employer to dictate the employees'
actions regarding union organization. These violations include discriminatory
discharge, threat of plant closure, threat of discharge, promise of benefits, grant
of benefits, and plant closure.
Briefly, discriminatory discharge refers to an employer's firing or layoff of
employees in retaliation for their support o f a union. Threat o f plant closure and
threat o f discharge are either overt or implied threats to close the plant or to discharge employees if union activities are not stoppped. An employer promises or
grants benefits as incentives for employees to cease their organizational efforts.

~Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
~Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
7SeeSection 10(e)of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §160(e).
*SeeBetheland Me/fi (1988)for a thorough analysis of the opinions of appeals courts in bargaining
order cases.
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Examples of such benefits include wage increases, increased break time, and better holiday and vacation privileges. Finally, plant closure refers to an employer's
t e m p o r a r y or permanent shutdown, specifically as a reaction to union organizational efforts. Although the commission o f one or m o r e hallmark violations does
not guarantee the issuance o f a bargaining order, the absence of all such unfair
labor practices does not preclude an order to bargain.
Besides the hallmark violations, other factors enter into the assessment of
the appropriateness of a bargaining order in any particular case. These factors include the other unfair labor practices committed by the employer, 9 the number of
employees in the bargaining unit, the strength of employee support for the union,
and factors specific to each case pertaining to the organizational campaign
period. The task of the NLRB is to determine whether or not an employer's actions
are pervasive enough to prevent the conduct o f a fair election, thus necessitating a
bargaining order. Otherwise, the employer is ordered to cease his unfair labor
practices, and a second (or first) election is ordered.
O f the 176 G i s s e l orders issued from 1979 to 1982, 108 were reviewed by the
courts of appeals. O f those, the court enforced the Board's order in 70.4 percent
of the cases. When bargaining orders are reviewed, with the employer, the NLRB,
or even both as petitioner, the appeals courts' authority is to determine if the
Board abused its discretion by issuing the order. I f the court determines that the
order was justified, the bargaining order is enforced. The proportion of bargaining orders that are enforced varies over time, but the orders are enforced more
often than not. Insight into what determines whether or not a bargaining order
will be enforced is gained by perusing the opinions o f the circuit courts for cases in
which bargaining orders have and have not been enforced.
One factor that might influence whether or not a bargaining order is enforced
is the employer's unfair labor practice campaign. The presence of any o f the haUm a r k violations, except perhaps plant closure, should have a positive effect on the
probability of enforcement. I f a plant closes, and the shutdown is not temporary,
then the court o f appeals might be less likely to uphold a bargaining order,
because there would be no employer with whom to bargain.i° It is difficult to predict which o f the remaining violations would have the largest impact on the
probability of enforcement.

~Common unfair labor practices (besides hallmark violations) committed by employers include
employee surveillance or impression of surveillance, employeeinterrogation, physical violence, overly
broad no distribution-no solicitation rules, and statements that bringing in a union would be futile.
Any employer action that interferes with employees' rights to organize is considered an unfair labor
practice.
'°Such enforcement decisions, however, are not entirely useless. It is clear, for example, that
employersmust bargain with the unions that represent their employeesover the effect on employeesof
the business closure. See, for example, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666
(1981). Presumably, however, a union would have little leverage to extract concessions (such as
severance pay) from an employer who had already ceased operations.
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Discriminatory discharge might be perceived as producing different effects
in different cases. For example, it is likely that the discharge of leading union
advocates or of a significant percentage of the bargaining unit would chill the
organizational interest of the remaining employees. In contrast, as the court
noted in N L R B v. L o y Food Stores, Inc. d / b / a Ken's I G A ,11 the firing of two
"teenage goof o f f " employees was thought to be "not likely to intimidate the
adult workforce." In short, discriminatory discharges might not produce the
same coercive effect in all cases, or the court of appeals' assessment of the effect
of a discriminatory discharge might differ from the NLRB's assessment. Still, it is
likely that the presence of one or more discriminatory discharges will add to the
probability that a bargaining order will be enforced.
Similarly, the grant of benefits could have differing effects on the probability
of enforcement in different cases. If the benefit granted was a substantial wage increase to all employees, for example, then this might be more likely to preclude a
fair election than would either a small wage increase or the granting of a fiveminute increase in break time. The category "grant of benefits," therefore, includes factors that increase the probability of enforcement with differing degrees
of impact. A parallel argument holds with respect to the promise of benefits.
Threats of discharge and threats of closure are likely to have fairly similar effects regardless of the characteristics of the bargaining units. The number of employees in the unit, however, might cause such threats to have differing effects and
might affect the perceived severity of other unfair labor practices. The issue of unit
size is discussed below. One additional observation is that these threats can either
be overt or implied. Whether or not threats are implied is a judgmental decision,
but the courts and the NLRB had little disagreement over this issue for the sample
under consideration. Again, the presence of either of these hallmark violations is
expected to increase the probability that a bargaining order will be enforced.
If the appellate courts are showing deference to the Board's assessment of
the effect of hallmark violations, then the presence of these violations should
have no effect on the probability of enforcement. Courts, however, often make
their own assessments as to the effects of employers' unfair labor practice campaigns. That is, the courts often mention one or more of the employer's unfair
labor practices in justifying their decision of whether or not to enforce the
Board's bargaining order. 12This implies that the presence of hallmark violations
will affect the probability of enforcement of bargaining orders as discussed here.
Another interesting influence is the passage of time between the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals decision. Courts have sometimes
justified a failure to enforce bargaining orders by alluding to the "changed circumstances doctrine," which takes into account changes occurring between the
time the Board issues its order and the time of the court's decision. When there is
"697 F. 2d 798 (7th Cir. 1983).
'2See Betheland Melfi(1988).
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significant delay, the court might also be influenced by changes that have occurred in the interval between the employer's unlawful conduct and the Board's
order. Changed circumstances include both employee turnover and the restructuring or replacement of management personnel. In many such cases, the passage
of time itself influences the court's decision.
Whether changed circumstances should be considered is a point on which the
appellate courts disagree. Some courts, in enforcing bargaining orders, have specifically mentioned that changed circumstances should not be taken into account.
If the presence of changed circumstances is a significant factor in the nonenforcement of a bargaining order, then the coefficient on the variable representing the number of months between the union's demand for recognition and the
court's decision should be negative, indicating a dampening effect on the probability of enforcement. If changed circumstances do not matter in the determination of whether or not a bargaining order will be enforced, however, then the
coefficient on the time lag would be close to zero. 13
Although both the Board and the courts sometimes speculate about the impact of unfair labor practices on small bargaining units, it is not easy to predict
the effect of unit size on the probability of enforcement. On the one hand, unfair
labor practices might have a more significant impact on employees in a small bargaining unit. This consideration should increase the likelihood of enforcement in
cases involving small bargaining units. This effect implies a negative value of the
coefficient on unit size; that is, enforcement is more likely in cases involving small
bargaining units. On the other hand, employee turnover during the delay between
the demand for recognition and judicial review is expected to result in a higher
employee replacement rate in a small unit than in a large one. High employee turnover is one of the changed circumstances that might detract from the likelihood of
enforcing a bargaining order, implying a higher probability of enforcement in
cases involving large bargaining units. Thus, the effect of unit size on the probability of enforcement is uncertain, a priori, and depends on which aspect of unit
size has the stronger influence.
With respect to bargaining order cases, Gissel requires only that the union at
some point demonstrate majority support. This being the case, it is not clear that
the level of employee support should affect the probability that a bargaining order
will be enforced. There is some indication, however, that the appeals courts take
into consideration how much above a minimum majority the employee support
was. If this is a factor in the appellate court decisions, then the empirical evidence
should demonstrate that higher employee support results in a higher probability
that a bargaining order will be enforced.
Differing attitudes among the twelve circuits toward bargaining orders can
be accounted for by differentiating among the circuits in which the appellate cases

,3For examples of cases on both sides of this debate, see Bethel and Melfi (1988).
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are decided. This would capture circuit-specific effects, such as whether or not
any particular circuits are tougher or more lenient than others in the treatment of
bargaining orders. The coefficients on the twelve circuits cannot be hypothesized
a priori, except through casual observations about the circuits, gathered from
reading the circuit courts' opinions in bargaining order cases. Based on such evidence, the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit appear to have much lower enforcement rates than the other circuits; no circuits appeared to be noticeably lenient in
the cases studied. Thus, negative coefficient estimates are expected on the variables representing the Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit.
III.

Data and M o d e l Specification

In order to address the questions posed above, we examined the population of all
bargaining orders issued during fiscal years 1979 through 1982. TM Of the 176
NLRB bargaining orders issued during that period, the appeals courts reviewed
108. Ofthose appeals, the bargaining order wasnot enforcedin 32 ofthe cases: of
the 76 enforced bargaining orders, 27 were enforced by memorandum decisions. 15
For the firms and unions involved in the 108 appealed cases, the following information was collected: unit size (number of employees in the bargaining unit);
NLRB region 1' in which the firm was located; the percentage of employees who
signed authorization cards at the time that the union demanded recognition (or
filed a petition); the time (in months) between the date of demand for recognition
and the date the NLRB issued the bargaining order; the time (in months) between
when the bargaining order was issued and the date of the court of appeals decision; the circuit and the outcome of the appellate case; and any unfair labor practices committed by the employer.
The information on employee support, region, unit size, time between demand for recognition and bargaining order, and unfair labor practices was collected from NLRB cases. Lexis (a computer assisted legal research service) and
the NLRB's Classified Index to Decisions were used to identify all bargaining
order cases within the study period. The remaining information was obtained
from the court of appeals opinions. Names, definitions of, and descriptive statistics on the variables used are included in Table 1.
"This period runs from October 1, 1978, through September 30, 1982. Fiscal years are used rather
than calendar years because the NLRB's records and statistics are maintained by fiscal years.
'SA memorandum decision usually denotes an unpublished order, the results of which are merely
noted in the Federal Reporter. Sometimes there is no official report of the court's action at all. In
those cases, we have gathered data either from unofficial case reports (such as the Labor Relations
Reference Manual) or from NLRB records that are available to the general public.
~6The NLRB is a federal administrative agency headquartered in Washington, DC. The Board maintains more than 30 regional offices throughout the United States. These offices are under the supervision
of the General Counsel, who acts as prosecutor in unfair labor practice cases. The primary activity of
the regional offices is the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practices and the holding of
elections in representation cases.
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Table 1

Summary of Data

Variable

ENFORCE (1 = enforced, 0 = not enforced)

Sample
Proportion
or Mean
.70

Standard
Deviation
--

Range
0 or 1

UNSTRNGTH (o7o authorization cards signed)

65.53

14.13

46.0-100.0

SIZE (# employees in bargaining unit)

76.57

123.57

2-1000

25.96

10.12

10.5-63.0

16.48

6.60

6.0-43.0

42.44

12.94

23.5-92.0

DEM-ORD (# months between demand for rec. and
date of bargaining ord.)

ORD-APP (# months between bargaining ord. and
appellate decision)

DEM-APP (# months between demand for rec. and
appellate decision)

DISCHG (1 = discriminatory discharge, 0 = none)

0.59

--

0 or 1
0 or 1

THRCLS (1 =threat of plant closure, 0 = n o n e )

0.47

--

THRDIS (1 = threat of discharge, 0 = none)

0.54

--

0 or 1

GRNTBEN (1 = grant of benefits, 0 = none)

0.44

--

0 or 1

P R O M B E N (1 =promise of benefits, 0 = n o n e )

0.49

--

0 or 1

CLOSE (1 = plant closure, 0 = none)

0.03

--

0 or 1

The variable, ENFORCE, represents the observation of the answer " y e s " or
" n o " to the question of whether or not each bargaining order was enforced. This
variable is defined to equal one if the bargaining order was enforced and zero if
not. The mean of ENFORCE, 0.70, indicates that 70 percent of the 108 bargaining orders in the sample were enforced by the courts of appeals.
In order to test the hypothesis about the effect of unit size on the probability
of a bargaining order being enforced, the variable, SIZE, was measured as the
number of employees in the bargaining unit. This number often changes during
the time between the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals
decision. When this was the case, the unit size at the date of the union's demand
was used, because the union's majority status is usually measured as of the time of
the demand. Unit size ranged from 2 to 1,000, with 76.57 employees being the
average size.

USTRNGTH, measured as a percentage, is used as an indication of
employee support for the union. Because elections were not conducted in all of
the cases examined in the study and because the elections held were "tainted" and
do not accurately indicate support for the union, strength of employee support is
measured as the number of authorization cards signed by employees in the bar-
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gaining unit (at the time of demand for recognition) divided by the total number
of employees in the bargaining unit (SIZE). This percentage was a majority (i.e.,
between 50 and 100) in all except one case. 17 Seven of the 108 observations on
employee support for the union showed complete (100 percent) support.
It is worth noting that Cooper (1984) examined the appropriateness of using
authorization cards as a measure of the amount of employee support for a union.
Cooper found evidence to indicate that majority employee support, as measured
using authorization cards, does not guarantee a union victory in an NLRBconducted election. This can be interpreted to demonstrate that the percentage of
authorization cards signed overstates the level of employee support for the union.
The average level of support for the unions in the cases studied is 65.53 percent.
Interestingly, this is close to the percentage at which Cooper found there to be a
50-50 chance of a union winning an election.
The effect of a delay on the probability of enforcement was measured using
the variables DEM-ORD, ORD-APP, and DEM-APP, which represent the number of months (to the nearest one-half month) between the union's demand for
recognition (or, if no demand was made, the filing of a petition) and the NLRB
decision, between the date of the NLRB decision and the court of appeals decision, and between the union's demand for recognition and the court of appeals
decision. If the coefficient on any of these variables is positive and significant,
then employers should be more eager to appeal the Board's decision in order to
cause further delay, thus reducing the probability of enforcing the bargaining
order.18 As can be seen in Table 1, several months or years can pass between a
union's demand for recognition and a final decision by the court of appeals.
The variables DISCHG, THRCLS, THRDIS, PROMBEN, GRNTBEN, and
CLOSE represent hallmark violations. They are set equal to one if the violation
was committed and zero if not. The unfair labor practices corresponding to these
six variables are: discriminatory discharge (or layoff), threat of plant closure,
threat of discharge, promise of benefits, grant of benefits, and plant closure.
With any of the hallmark violations, it seems reasonable to assume that an employer's action would tend to undermine union support, thus making it more likely
that a bargaining order will be enforced.

'TThe case in which a bargaining order was issued even though there was never any indication of majority support for the union is Conair Corporation, 261 NLRB 1189 (1982). Of the 176 bargaining
orders issued by the NLRB during the sample period, there was one other in which there was no indication of majority support. United Dairy Farmers Cooperative, 257 NLRB 772 (1981) did not go to the
court of appeals and is not included in our sample of 108 appealed cases. The Board overruled Conair
and disclaimed its authority to issue non-majority bargaining orders in Gourmet Foods, Inc., 270
NLRB (1984).
~SAs noted previously, employers still have an incentive to appeal bargaining order decisions, even if
there is little chance that the order will be overturned. This is because such employers want to put off
the bargaining obligation as long as possible.
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The most frequently observed hallmark violation was discriminatory discharge, which was committed by 59 percent of the employers. This may be an
indication that employers assume that the discharge of employees for union activity is an effective unfair labor practice for them to utilize.~9 Close behind discriminatory discharge is the threat of discharge, committed by 54 percent of the
employers. The least frequently used (and arguably the most drastic) hallmark
violation was plant closure. Only 3 out of the 108 employers closed down,
although 47 percent (51 employers) threatened to close. Finally, nearly half of the
employers promised benefits to the employees in order to discourage support for
a union, and 44 percent of the employers actually granted benefits to the employees for that purpose.
Table 2 summarizes the appellate courts' decisions, broken down according
to the circuits in which the appeals were heard. The average enforcement rate for
all circuits is 70.4 percent. The enforcement rates of only two circuits - - the Second and the Seventh - - are significantly different from the average. In both cases,
the enforcement rates of the circuits are significantly lower than the overall
enforcement rate. Accordingly, two variables, representing the Second and
Seventh Circuits, are included in the estimating model. The expected signs of the

Table 2

Summary of Appellate Court Decisions
Circuit

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

DC
Totals:

Number of Cases
(out of 108)

6
11
14
7
3
19
8
13
15
2
3
7

(5.6°7o)
(10.2070)
(13.007o)
(6.507o)
(2.8070)
(17.607o)
(7.4070)
(12.007o)
(13.9070)
(1.907o)
(2.8070)
(6.5070)

108 (100.0°70)

Number Enforced
(out of cases in Cir)

4
5
12
4
3
15
2
11
11
2
2
5

(66.7%)
(45.507o)
(85.707o)
(57.107o)
(100.007o)
(78.9070)
(25.0070)
(84.6070)
(73.3°70)
(100.007o)
(66.7070)
(71.407o)

76 (70.407o)

Number Not Enforced
(out of cases in Cir)

2
6
2
3
0
4
6
2
4
0
1
2

(33.3070)
(54.5%)
(14.307o)
02.9%)
(0.0070)
(21.107o)
(75.0070)
(15.407o)
(26.707o)
(0.0070)
(33.3070)
(28.6070)

32 (29.607o)

'91n an article criticizing the NLRA representation process, Weiler (1983) referred to discriminatory
discharge as "the most powerful weapon in the employer's arsenal" (p. 1779), adding that "the dismissal of key union adherents gives a chilling edge to the warning that union representation is likely to
be more trouble for the employees than it is worth" (p. 1778).

C. A. M E L F I and T. A. B E T H E L

265

coefficients on these variables are negative, meaning that cases in the Second and
Seventh circuits have a lower probability of being enforced than do cases in the
other circuits, ceteris paribus.
As previously noted, the observation on the dependent variable is simply the
answer " y e s " or " n o " to the question of whether or not the bargaining order was
enforced by the court of appeals. Therefore, the observed dependent variable is
assigned a value of 1 if the order in case i was enforced and 0 if not (i = 1. . . . . 108).
Such a binary dependent variable suggests the binary probit model 2° and can be
summarized as:
ENFORCE~ = c~ + X;y=,~jXu + e~,

i = 1. . . . .

108

(1)

where E N F O R C E is the binary dependent variable, the X's are the independent
variables that are hypothesized to affect the probability of enforcement, e is a
normally distributed error term, and ~ (the constant term) and the/3's are the
coefficients to be estimated by maximum likelihood. The specific form of equation (1) that was estimated is:
ENFORCE~ = c~ + t$1USTRNGTH~ + ~2DEM-APP~ + B3DISCHG~
+ I~4THRCLS~ + (3sTHRDIS, + B6GRNTBEN~
+ t~TPROMBEN, + f3sCIR2, +

139CIR7~ + e,,

where the subscript i represents case number, with i = 1. . . . .
IV.

(2)

108. 2'

Results

The coefficient estimates for the model presented in the previous section are
reported in Table 3. These estimates must be interpreted carefully. They do not
represent the effect on the probability o f enforcement resulting from a one unit
change in the corresponding independent variable as in a linear model. Rather,
the change in the probability of enforcement resulting from a one unit change in
an independent variable depends on the original probability of enforcement and,
therefore, on the initial values of all the independent variables and on their estimated coefficients. More precisely, OProb(y, = l)/Ox~j = f(x'~)t3j, where f ( . ) is

2°Alternatively, a logit model could be estimated in this framework. The difference between the binary
probit and logit models is the assumption concerning the distribution of the random error term. The
error term is assumed to follow a normal distribution in the probit model, whereas in the logit model,
it is assumed to follow the extreme value distribution. Because both models are equally easy (in terms
of computer time) to estimate, the probit model was chosen because the normal distribution for the
error term is believed to be more realistic than the extreme value distribution implicitly assumed in the
logit model.
2,The variable CLOSE, representing the hallmark violation of plant closure, was not included in the
estimating model. There were only three cases in which this violation occurred; therefore, the variable
CLOSE is equal to zero for 105 of the 108 observations.
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the standard normal density function and Prob(yl = 1) ranges from zero to one? 2
The above expression depends on the point at which f(x' [3) is evaluated. Specifically, this expression will be higher at values of x'B that are close to the sample
mean o f y (.704) and lower at probabilities of enforcement close to zero and one.
Evaluations of these partial derivatives, in order to estimate the effects of changing values of the independent variables on the probability of enforcement, are
presented in the last column of Table 3. These expressions are evaluated at the
sample mean values of the variables.

Table 3

Estimated Coefficients and Partial Derivatives
Evaluated at Sample Means
(standard errors in parentheses)

Variable

Coefficient

CONSTANT

- 1.6741
(1.1115)

USTRNGTH
DEM-APP

0.0282**
(0.0122)
- 0.0048

Partial
Derivative

0.0088**
- 0.0015

(0.0116)

DISCHG

0.4949"
(0.3098)

O. 1541 *

THRCLS

0.8147"*
(0.3165)

0.2537**

THRDIS

0.0627
(0.3059)

0.0195

GRNTBEN

0.4943*
(0.3225)

0.1540"

PROMBEN

- 0.0322
(0.3060)

- 0.0100

CIR2

- 1.2248"*
(0.4503)

- 0.3815"*

CIR7

- 1.6192"*
(0.5980)

- 0.5043**

*significant at 10 percent level.
**significant at 1 percent level.

" F o r a thorough, easy to follow explanation of the interpretation of probit coefficients, see Becker
and Waldman (1987).
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Missing from the estimating model is the variable SIZE, measured as the number of employees in the bargaining unit. When this variable was included, it was
found not to have a significant effect on the probability of enforcement. Furthermore, the inclusion of SIZE along with the variable USTRNGTHresulted in some
multicollinearity in the estimation. This is due to the fact that the size of the bargaining unit is inversely related to the strength of employee support for the union.2~
Employee support (USTRNGTH) was found to have a small, positive effect
on the probability that a bargaining order will be enforced. This result can be interpreted in light of Cooper's (1984) findings concerning the relationship between
the level of employee support and the likelihood of a union election victory.
Cooper found evidence to indicate that majority employee support, measured the
same way as the variable USTRNGTH, does not guarantee a union victory in an
NLRB-conducted election. Still, Cooper found a direct relationship between the
level of employee support and the probability of the union winning an election. In
terms of the present study, the value of approximately .03 for the estimated coefficient on USTRNGTH indicates that at the mean levels of the explanatory variables a 10 percent increase in employee support for the union will result in the
probability of enforcement increasing by approximately 0.088.
It is not entirely clear why the level of employee support should increase a
court's willingness to enforce a bargaining order. The critical inquiry is not the
level of support (assuming it is at least a majority), but rather the effect of the
employer's unlawful conduct. As speculated in Section II, a court may be more
willing to defer to the Board's assumptions about the coercive effect of employer
action when the union has had substantial support. That is, the court might be
more willing to accept the Board's conclusion that a union's election loss was
caused by coercion (rather than by a mere loss of interest) when it had previously
garnered significant employee support.
Somewhat surprisingly, the length of time between a union's demand for recognition and the circuit court's decision was found to have no significant effect
on the probability of enforcement. It was hypothesized that changed circumstances might decrease the probability of enforcement, especially because courts
often refer to that factor in their non-enforcement decisions. The estimated coefficient on DEM-APP, however, is close to zero, and it is insignificant in explaining the probability of enforcement. The components of DEM-APP (DEM-ORD
and ORD-APP) were included separately in other estimating equations, and
neither was found to have a significant effect on the probability of enforcement.
Despite some courts' assertions to the contrary, their failure to enforce bargaining
orders cannot be accounted for by pointing to the changed circumstances doctrine.
Rather, the courts appear to be using that doctrine to justify decisions actually
reached on other grounds.
2'Small units tend to havehighemployeesupport. The units with 100percent support for the union
ranged in size from 2 to 7.
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Although the passage of time does not affect the chance of enforcement, it
does appear to reduce a union's chances of successful negotiations with the
employer. Even with an enforcement rate of over 70 percent, employers still
benefit when courts review bargaining order cases. Besides simply putting off the
bargaining obligation, evidence suggests that the delay contributes a more significant effect. In some appealed cases, a substantial number of union supporters
leave the work force before judicial enforcement. At the time of the court's order,
then, the bargaining unit is comprised of many employees who were not working
for the employer during the union organizing campaign. This causes some unions
to abandon the bargaining relationship because of a lack of employee support. 24
The most consequential hallmark violations were discriminatory discharge,
threat of plant closure, and grant of benefits. The effects of these unfair labor
practices were found to be positive and significant in explaining the probability of
enforcement. A case in which a discriminatory discharge was committed (not
considering how many employees were discharged) is estimated to have a 0.154
more probable chance of being enforced than a case in which no discriminatory
discharge took place. The presence of the threat of plant closure is estimated to increase the probability of enforcement by 0.254, and the grant of benefits raises
the probability of enforcement by an estimated 0.154, which is the same as the
estimated effect of discriminatory discharge.
These findings, however, do not necessarily mean that the courts defer to
NLRB decisions concerning the effect of unfair labor practices. They may merely
indicate that the courts agree with the Board's assumptions about the effect of
certain actions. This analysis is supported by noting that unfair labor practices,
other than the three mentioned above, had no significant effect on the probability
of enforcement. This might indicate that the courts are making their own estimation of the likely effect of an employer's conduct rather than deferring to the
Board's assessments. Such action clearly could not be justified under the standard of review established by the Supreme Court.
As expected, bargaining order cases that were heard in the Second and
Seventh circuits have significantly lower probabilities of enforcement than those
reviewed by other circuits. Cases going to the Second Circuit are estimated to
have a 0.382 lower probability of being enforced than do other cases. For the
Seventh Circuit, the estimated effect on the probability of enforcement is to lower
it by a factor of 0.504. Closer examination of the opinions written in the Second
and Seventh circuit cases sheds some light on the reasons for these lower enforcement rates. Based on the circuit court opinions used in this study, it appears that

24This evidence is based on preliminary data collection for a project that examines unions that have
been brought about by bargaining orders and compares these unions with unions that were elected
during the same time-period. Many of the bargaining order unions have abandoned their bargaining
relationship with the employer, citing lack of employee support, due to substantial employee turnover
since the employer's unfair labor practice campaign, as the reason for abandonment.
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the Second and Seventh circuits place unrealistically high explanation requirements on the Board in bargaining order cases, resulting in these circuits enforcing
smaller proportions of bargaining orders than any of the other circuits.
Given the reduced probability that orders heard by the Second and Seventh
circuits will be enforced, employers located within those jurisdictions have considerable incentive to seek judicial review. This is especially true given the tendency
of both circuits to mention delay in the assessment of an order's propriety. Conversely, to the extent that forum shopping is possible, union representatives should
make an effort to avoid having bargaining order appeals heard in the Second and
Seventh circuits. 2~

V.

Concluding Comments

An examination of the factors that determine whether or not an NLRB bargaining order will be enforced by the court of appeals revealed some interesting
results. The most significant effect on the probability of enforcement was determined to be the circuit in which the case was heard. Both the Second and the
Seventh circuits have much lower enforcement rates in bargaining order cases
than do any of the other circuits.
Other significant factors include the level of employee support for the union
and the type of hallmark violations committed by the employer. The directions of
the effects of each of these factors were as expected. The most significant hallmark violations were found to be discriminatory discharge, threat of plant
closure, and grant of benefits. The presence of any of these unfair labor practices
increased the probability of enforcement by over 0.15. It was also found that the
lengths of the judicial delays in bargaining order cases do not reduce the probability of enforcement, despite the occasional mention of changed circumstances
as a justification for overturning the NLRB's bargaining order decisions.
Much empirical research still needs to be done in the area of bargaining
orders. Other topics include the comparison of unions that were installed as a
result of bargaining orders with those that were elected by the employees in an
NLRB-conducted election. This topic is currently being researched and promises
to shed more light on the controversy surrounding bargaining orders.

2~Section 10(f) of the Act authorizes "any person aggrieved" by an NLRB unfair labor practice order
(typically the losing party) to seek review in the circuit court of appeals "wherein the unfair labor practice was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the
United States Caurt of Appeals for the District of Columbia." Similarly, under Section 10(e), the
Board can seek review either in the circuit where the unfair labor practice occurred or where the
employer "resides or transacts business."
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